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Which is NOT a criticism of Kant's theory of experience?
{ 1 } - If there are no synthetic a priori propositions, how would one explain how the propositions of mathematics and natural science both are necessary and apply to experience?
{ 2 } - Copleston wonders whether we don't have an (intellectual) intuition, not of spiritual realities such as God, but of being, and from that intuition we get the principle that every event has a cause.
{ 3 } - Kant based his complete table of categories on the types of judgment from the formal logic with which he was familiar and which might not be correct.
{ 4 } - Kant's theory of experience is based on the presupposition that there are synthetic a priori propositions--if there are none, his theory falls. See p. 275.
{ 5 } - Acceptance of synthetic a priori propositions does not necessarily accept Kant's "Copernican" revolution that the necessity and universality of such propositions comes from the subject.
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1 is correct!
Which is NOT a criticism of Kant's theory of experience?
{ 1 } - If there are no synthetic a priori propositions, how would one explain how the propositions of mathematics and natural science both are necessary and apply to experience?
{ 2 } - Copleston wonders whether we don't have an (intellectual) intuition, not of spiritual realities such as God, but of being, and from that intuition we get the principle that every event has a cause.
{ 3 } - Kant based his complete table of categories on the types of judgment from the formal logic with which he was familiar and which might not be correct.
{ 4 } - Kant's theory of experience is based on the presupposition that there are synthetic a priori propositions--if there are none, his theory falls. See p. 275.
{ 5 } - Acceptance of synthetic a priori propositions does not necessarily accept Kant's "Copernican" revolution that the necessity and universality of such propositions comes from the subject.
This question supports Kant's theory rather than criticizes it.
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2 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT a criticism of Kant's theory of experience?
{ 1 } - If there are no synthetic a priori propositions, how would one explain how the propositions of mathematics and natural science both are necessary and apply to experience?
{ 2 } - Copleston wonders whether we don't have an (intellectual) intuition, not of spiritual realities such as God, but of being, and from that intuition we get the principle that every event has a cause.
{ 3 } - Kant based his complete table of categories on the types of judgment from the formal logic with which he was familiar and which might not be correct.
{ 4 } - Kant's theory of experience is based on the presupposition that there are synthetic a priori propositions--if there are none, his theory falls. See p. 275.
{ 5 } - Acceptance of synthetic a priori propositions does not necessarily accept Kant's "Copernican" revolution that the necessity and universality of such propositions comes from the subject.
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3 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT a criticism of Kant's theory of experience?
{ 1 } - If there are no synthetic a priori propositions, how would one explain how the propositions of mathematics and natural science both are necessary and apply to experience?
{ 2 } - Copleston wonders whether we don't have an (intellectual) intuition, not of spiritual realities such as God, but of being, and from that intuition we get the principle that every event has a cause.
{ 3 } - Kant based his complete table of categories on the types of judgment from the formal logic with which he was familiar and which might not be correct.
{ 4 } - Kant's theory of experience is based on the presupposition that there are synthetic a priori propositions--if there are none, his theory falls. See p. 275.
{ 5 } - Acceptance of synthetic a priori propositions does not necessarily accept Kant's "Copernican" revolution that the necessity and universality of such propositions comes from the subject.
Copleston thinks, however, that Kant's formal logic could be corrected without abandoning his general theory. See p. 275.
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4 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT a criticism of Kant's theory of experience?
{ 1 } - If there are no synthetic a priori propositions, how would one explain how the propositions of mathematics and natural science both are necessary and apply to experience?
{ 2 } - Copleston wonders whether we don't have an (intellectual) intuition, not of spiritual realities such as God, but of being, and from that intuition we get the principle that every event has a cause.
{ 3 } - Kant based his complete table of categories on the types of judgment from the formal logic with which he was familiar and which might not be correct.
{ 4 } - Kant's theory of experience is based on the presupposition that there are synthetic a priori propositions--if there are none, his theory falls. See p. 275.
{ 5 } - Acceptance of synthetic a priori propositions does not necessarily accept Kant's "Copernican" revolution that the necessity and universality of such propositions comes from the subject.
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5 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT a criticism of Kant's theory of experience?
{ 1 } - If there are no synthetic a priori propositions, how would one explain how the propositions of mathematics and natural science both are necessary and apply to experience?
{ 2 } - Copleston wonders whether we don't have an (intellectual) intuition, not of spiritual realities such as God, but of being, and from that intuition we get the principle that every event has a cause.
{ 3 } - Kant based his complete table of categories on the types of judgment from the formal logic with which he was familiar and which might not be correct.
{ 4 } - Kant's theory of experience is based on the presupposition that there are synthetic a priori propositions--if there are none, his theory falls. See p. 275.
{ 5 } - Acceptance of synthetic a priori propositions does not necessarily accept Kant's "Copernican" revolution that the necessity and universality of such propositions comes from the subject.
There might be an intellectual intuition of the object rather than an intuition, e.g., of the forms of space and time (and the categories of the understanding).
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the end