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Which is NOT part of Kant's refutation of problematic (Cartesian) idealism:
{ 1 } - My existence in time requires the existence of something external to me. 274
{ 2 } - The something permanent cannot be within me since it is the condition of my existence in time.
{ 3 } - I am conscious of my empirical ego in time, successive states.
{ 4 } - Every representation of external reality is correct.
{ 5 } - "we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter." B278
{ 6 } - Succession requires the existence of something permanent.
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1 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT part of Kant's refutation of problematic (Cartesian) idealism:
{ 1 } - My existence in time requires the existence of something external to me. 274
{ 2 } - The something permanent cannot be within me since it is the condition of my existence in time.
{ 3 } - I am conscious of my empirical ego in time, successive states.
{ 4 } - Every representation of external reality is correct.
{ 5 } - "we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter." B278
{ 6 } - Succession requires the existence of something permanent.
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2 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT part of Kant's refutation of problematic (Cartesian) idealism:
{ 1 } - My existence in time requires the existence of something external to me. 274
{ 2 } - The something permanent cannot be within me since it is the condition of my existence in time.
{ 3 } - I am conscious of my empirical ego in time, successive states.
{ 4 } - Every representation of external reality is correct.
{ 5 } - "we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter." B278
{ 6 } - Succession requires the existence of something permanent.
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3 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT part of Kant's refutation of problematic (Cartesian) idealism:
{ 1 } - My existence in time requires the existence of something external to me. 274
{ 2 } - The something permanent cannot be within me since it is the condition of my existence in time.
{ 3 } - I am conscious of my empirical ego in time, successive states.
{ 4 } - Every representation of external reality is correct.
{ 5 } - "we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter." B278
{ 6 } - Succession requires the existence of something permanent.
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4 is correct!
Which is NOT part of Kant's refutation of problematic (Cartesian) idealism:
{ 1 } - My existence in time requires the existence of something external to me. 274
{ 2 } - The something permanent cannot be within me since it is the condition of my existence in time.
{ 3 } - I am conscious of my empirical ego in time, successive states.
{ 4 } - Every representation of external reality is correct.
{ 5 } - "we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter." B278
{ 6 } - Succession requires the existence of something permanent.
No, there are representations such as dreams and madness that are not correct, but Kant holds that consciousness in general requires external reality. See p. 274.
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5 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT part of Kant's refutation of problematic (Cartesian) idealism:
{ 1 } - My existence in time requires the existence of something external to me. 274
{ 2 } - The something permanent cannot be within me since it is the condition of my existence in time.
{ 3 } - I am conscious of my empirical ego in time, successive states.
{ 4 } - Every representation of external reality is correct.
{ 5 } - "we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter." B278
{ 6 } - Succession requires the existence of something permanent.
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6 is wrong. Please try again.
Which is NOT part of Kant's refutation of problematic (Cartesian) idealism:
{ 1 } - My existence in time requires the existence of something external to me. 274
{ 2 } - The something permanent cannot be within me since it is the condition of my existence in time.
{ 3 } - I am conscious of my empirical ego in time, successive states.
{ 4 } - Every representation of external reality is correct.
{ 5 } - "we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only matter." B278
{ 6 } - Succession requires the existence of something permanent.
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the end