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A fallacy of the mechanistic rejection of teleology is
{ 1 } - the supposition that purpose necessarily implies consciousness in that which tends to a goal.
{ 2 } - the position that homeostatic systems involve purposeful tendencies.
{ 3 } - the position that you can know what something is through knowing its goals.
{ 4 } - the supposition that identification of an agent-cause is not a sufficient explanation of a process.
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1 is correct!
A fallacy of the mechanistic rejection of teleology is
{ 1 } - the supposition that purpose necessarily implies consciousness in that which tends to a goal.
{ 2 } - the position that homeostatic systems involve purposeful tendencies.
{ 3 } - the position that you can know what something is through knowing its goals.
{ 4 } - the supposition that identification of an agent-cause is not a sufficient explanation of a process.
See p. 29. Plants and animals have goals that they are not conscious of.
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2 is wrong. Please try again.
A fallacy of the mechanistic rejection of teleology is
{ 1 } - the supposition that purpose necessarily implies consciousness in that which tends to a goal.
{ 2 } - the position that homeostatic systems involve purposeful tendencies.
{ 3 } - the position that you can know what something is through knowing its goals.
{ 4 } - the supposition that identification of an agent-cause is not a sufficient explanation of a process.
Such purpose is what mechanism does not take account of.
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3 is wrong. Please try again.
A fallacy of the mechanistic rejection of teleology is
{ 1 } - the supposition that purpose necessarily implies consciousness in that which tends to a goal.
{ 2 } - the position that homeostatic systems involve purposeful tendencies.
{ 3 } - the position that you can know what something is through knowing its goals.
{ 4 } - the supposition that identification of an agent-cause is not a sufficient explanation of a process.
That is the Greek, not the mechanistic, concept of the nature of a thing.
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4 is wrong. Please try again.
A fallacy of the mechanistic rejection of teleology is
{ 1 } - the supposition that purpose necessarily implies consciousness in that which tends to a goal.
{ 2 } - the position that homeostatic systems involve purposeful tendencies.
{ 3 } - the position that you can know what something is through knowing its goals.
{ 4 } - the supposition that identification of an agent-cause is not a sufficient explanation of a process.
Mechanists suppose that identifying the agent cause sufficiently explains a process.
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the end